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PEOPLE v. EWOLDT: THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT'S ABOUT-FACE ON THE
PLAN THEORY FOR ADMITTING
EVIDENCE OF AN ACCUSED'S
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
Miguel A. Mdndez*
& Edward J. Imwinkelried**
Law of Motion #3: To every action there is always opposed
an equal reaction ....
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been called "the Prosecutor's Delight."2 It is evidence of
the accused's uncharged misconduct. Although the accused is charged
with one crime, time and again prosecutors attempt to introduce evi-
dence of other, uncharged misdeeds allegedly committed by the ac-
cused. For example, in the prosecution for the Atlanta child killings,
Wayne Williams was formally charged with only two murders.' How-
ever, the prosecutor succeeded in persuading the trial judge to admit
testimony about ten other killings allegedly perpetrated by Williams.
4
Evidence of other sexual misconduct also figured prominently in the
trial of boxer Mike Tyson.5 While the only accusation lodged against
Tyson was raping a particular contestant in a beauty pageant, the
court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of sexual ad-
* Professor of Law, Stanford University; A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, George Washington
University. Research for this Article was supported by the Stanford Legal Research Fund,
made possible by a bequest from Ira S. Lillick and by gifts from other friends of Stanford
Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; A.B., 1967, J.D., 1969, Univer-
sity of San Francisco. Professor Imwinkelried wishes to express his gratitude to Ms. Jen-
nifer Cheng, J.D., 1994, University of California at Davis, whose research paper on the
plan theory inspired this Article.
1. SIR ISAAC NEWTON, MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES 13 (Florian Cajori ed. & Andrew
Motte trans., 1934).
2. Rand Karl Shotwell, Comment, Exclusion of Prior Acquittals: An Attack on the
"Prosecutor's Delight", 21 UCLA L. REV. 892, 892 (1974).
3. Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40, 48 (Ga. 1983).
4. Id.
5. William Nack, On Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 20, 1992, at 46, 49.
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vances Tyson allegedly made toward other contestants.6 Likewise, the
turning point in the William Kennedy Smith rape case was the trial
judge's decision to bar any mention of three other sexual assaults al-
legedly committed by Smith.7
Prosecutors relish proffering uncharged misconduct evidence be-
cause they realize that it is so devastating to the defense. A London
School of Economics study of jury behavior found that the admission
of evidence of an accused's uncharged crimes significantly increases
the probability of conviction.8 American researchers have come to
the same conclusion. In the 1960s the Chicago Jury Project concluded
that, as a practical matter, the presumption of innocence operates only
for an accused without a prior criminal history.9 In the 1980s the Na-
tional Science Foundation Law and Social Science Project sponsored
an empirical investigation of the prejudicial impact of various types of
evidence. The type of evidence most consistently rated damning was
"evidence suggesting [other] immoral conduct by the defendant."10
Prosecutors favor uncharged misconduct evidence precisely be-
cause they know that it is one of "the most prejudicial [types of] evi-
dence imaginable."" The numbers tell the story. Dean McCormick
once remarked that the decisions on this issue are as numerous "as the
sands of the seas."' 2 In criminal cases the admissibility of uncharged
misconduct is the single most commonly litigated evidentiary issue on
appeal. 3 The federal statute on point, Federal Rule of Evidence
6. Sonja Steptoe, A Damnable Defense, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 24, 1992, at 92.
7. Mark Hansen, Experts Expected Smith Verdict, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 18; Subvert
Damaging Testimony, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1992, at S3.
8. Nickolas J. Kyser, Comment, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U.
MICH. J.L. Rm. 535, 543-44 (1974).
9. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160-61,178-79 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1971) (1966); see also Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of
Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 (1961) ("'The jurors almost univer-
sally used defendant's record to conclude that he was a bad man and hence was more likely
than not guilty of the crime for which he was then standing trial.'" (quoting Letter from
Dale W. Broeder, Associate Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law, to Yale
Law Journal (Mar. 14, 1960))).
10. Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges
Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147, 1162.
11. People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415,429,722 P.2d 197,205,228 Cal. Rptr. 913,922
(1986).
12. 2 DAVID W. LOUisELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140,
at 113 (1978).
13. Byron N. Miller, Note, Admissibility of Other Offense Evidence After State v.
Houghton, 25 S.D. L. REv. 166, 167 (1980).
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404(b), has generated more published opinions than any other provi-
sion of the Federal Rules.'4
Statutes such as Rule 404(b) and California Evidence Code sec-
tion 1101(b) prescribe the hurdle that prosecutors must surmount in
order to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence. 5 Section 1101(b)
provides that, although evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he or she conformed his or her conduct therewith, the ban does not
prohibit the admission of such evidence "when relevant to prove some
fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, absence of mistake or accident...) other than his or
her disposition to commit such an act." 6
This statutory scheme is comprised of a negative prohibition as
well as an affirmative authorization. California Evidence Code sec-
tion 1101(a), like Rule 404(b), codifies the traditional, common-law
ban on the use of character evidence. 17 These rules forbid the prose-
cutor from offering evidence of an accused's uncharged misdeeds to
prove that the accused is guilty of committing the crime charged be-
cause he or she is the kind of person who would commit such an of-
fense.' 8 The California Code and the Federal Rules preclude the use
of this theory of logical relevance because each link in the chain of
reasoning raises significant questions about whether the accused can
be tried fairly.
The first link would require the jurors to consciously focus on the
kind of person the accused is.19 If the jurors are forced to evaluate the
accused's character, they could be subconsciously tempted to decide
the case on an improper basis. After learning of the accused's mis-
deeds, the jurors might be inclined to convict even if they otherwise
have a reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt of the charged of-
fense. In our legal system the accused are accountable "'for what
14. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEMI & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1
404[08], at 404-46 to 404-47 (1994).
15. FED. R. Evm. 404(b); CAL. EvmD. CODE § 1101(b) (West Supp. 1994).
16. CAL. EV,. CODE § 1101(b); see also FED. R. Evro. 404(b) ("Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts ... may ... be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident .... ).
17. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a).
18. FED. R. EvrD. 404(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a).
19. People v. Vanderliet, 508 N.W.2d 114,121 (Mich. 1993) (quoting People v. Engel-
man, 453 N.W.2d 656, 661 n.16 (Mich. 1990) (quoting EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UN-
CHARGED MiscoNDucr EVIDENCE § 2:18, at 48-49 (1984))).
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they do and not for what they are.' "20 The United States Supreme
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment forbids convicting persons on account of their
status.21 That prohibition precludes convicting on the basis of the ac-
cused's status as a recidivist.22
After reaching a conclusion about the accused's character, the
second link in the chain of reasoning would compel the jurors to use
their conclusion about the accused's character as a basis for predicting
whether, on the occasion in question, the accused engaged in conduct
consistent with that character.' The prevailing view of social science
researchers is not only that character is a poor predictor of conduct,
but that laypeople-including jurors-give character undue weight as
a predictor.24 Jurors might well overestimate the value of evidence
that in fact says little or nothing about the likelihood of the charged
behavior. Although the ban on character evidence predated the scien-
tific studies, these dangers nevertheless account for the character evi-
dence prohibition found in the Federal Rules and California Code.
That negative prohibition, though, is only part of the statutory
framework. California Evidence Code section 1101(b), as well as Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b), affirmatively allow prosecutors to offer
evidence of an accused's uncharged misconduct to prove any relevant
proposition other than the accused's predisposition to commit the of-
fense charged.' The rules of evidence recognize that evidence that
may be inadmissible for one purpose may nonetheless be received for
some other admissible purpose.26 Since, in this instance, the jurors are
not being asked to pass on the accused's character, the dangers at-
tending character evidence are largely absent. The California Code
and the Federal Rules legitimate noncharacter theories of logical rele-
20. MIGUEL A. MNDEz, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 3.04, at 34 (1993) (quoting HER-
BERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANC'ION 74 (1968)).
21. I& at 34 n.10 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
22. The Eighth Amendment does not forbid punishing recidivism. Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980). Under recidivist statutes, however, the accused's past convic-
tions are used solely to enhance punishment and not as evidence of the accused's guilt of
the offense charged. See id. at 284 ("The purpose of a recidivist statute ... is not to
simplify the task of prosecutors, judges, or juries. Its primary goals are to deter repeat
offenders and ... to segregate [those] person[s] from the rest of society for an extended
period of time.").
23. VanderViet, 508 N.W.2d at 12i (quoting People v. Engelman, 453 N.W.2d 656, 661
n.16 (Mich. 1990) (quoting EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCr EVI-
DENCE § 2:18, at 48-49 (1984))).
24. MNDEZ, supra note 20, § 3.04, at 34.
25. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. FED. R. Evm. 105; CAL. EVID. CODE § 355 (West 1966).
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vance because under those theories, there is little or no policy reason
for depriving the jurors of relevant evidence.
The courts have developed a myriad of noncharacter theories for
admitting evidence of an accused's uncharged crimes. One is the well-
settled modus operandi theory for proving an accused's identity as the
perpetrator of the crime charged.2 7 Under this theory, prosecutors
may offer evidence of uncharged misdeeds if the unique circumstances
attending the commission of the uncharged and charged misdeeds are
so distinctive as to suggest that only one person-the accused-com-
mitted the misdeed charged.l For example, when the prosecutor can
show that the unique circumstances attending the charged killing are
nearly identical to those surrounding other killings committed by the
accused, the use of the other crimes evidence does not violate the ban
on the use of character evidence.29 The jurors are not being asked to
convict because the accused is a bad person or even the kind of person
who would perpetrate the offense charged. Rather, they are being
urged to convict because the charged and uncharged offenses were
committed by a one-of-a-kind methodology, suggesting that the ac-
cused is the person who committed the offense charged. Once the
judge is convinced that the manner in which the charged and un-
charged offenses were committed is idiosyncratic, the judge may allow
the jurors to consider the evidence of the uncharged offenses as proof
that it is unlikely that another person committed the charged crime 3
Of course, it is possible that a copycat criminal perpetrated the
charged offense. However, that possibility is but a factor the jurors
can take into account in determining how much weight, if any, to give
to the evidence of the uncharged offense.31
An increasingly popular noncharacter theory of admissibility is
the doctrine of chances.32 Assume, for example, that when the police
lawfully stop the accused's vehicle, they discover contraband drugs in
27. 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140,
at 264-68 (rev. ed. 1985); see also 1 CHARLES TILFoRD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 190 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. practitioner treatise ser. 1992) (stating
evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible "[tlo prove other crimes by the accused so
nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused").
28. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 27, § 190, at 801-03.
29. Id. at 801 n.19 (citing People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P.2d 924 (1946) and
Commonwealth v. Wable, 114 A.2d 334 (Pa. 1955)).
30. See 2 LOuisELL & MUELLER, supra note 27, § 140, at 265.
31. See FED. R. EVID. 104(e); CAL EVID. CODE § 406 (West 1966).
32. See, e.g., United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S.
Ct. 321 (1991); Vanderliet, 508 N.W.2d at 128-29 & n.35; State v. Allen, 725 P.2d 331, 334
(Or. 1986).
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the trunk. The accused disclaims any knowledge of the presence of
the drugs. However, the prosecutor has evidence that on four prior
occasions, the accused was found driving a vehicle containing illegal
drugs. It is true that innocent persons sometimes become enmeshed
in suspicious circumstances, but the more often such events occur, the
claim that the accused acted innocently becomes less plausible.3 3 The
extraordinary coincidence flies in the face of common sense and al-
lows jurors to conclude that it is objectively unlikely that the accused
was ignorant of the presence of the drugs. The prosecutor need not
rely on an inference about the accused's subjective character. Hence,
under the doctrine of chances, the uncharged misconduct can be pro-
bative of mens rea without running afoul of the character evidence
prohibition. The California Evidence Code and the Federal Rules of
Evidence expressly recognize that evidence of other misdeeds may be
offered to prove the accused's guilty "knowledge. 34
Another popular noncharacter theory is common plan or
scheme.35 Assume a sex offense prosecition in which the accused
does not dispute the victim's claims of abuse. The accused simply
claims to have not committed the abuse. May the prosecution call
other witnesses to the stand to testify that the accused also abused
them? The prosecutor may do so only if the prosecution's theory is
that the accused perpetrated the charged offense as part of a common
plan to commit the charged and uncharged offenses.3 6 Both the Cali-
fornia Code and the Federal Rules include "plan" in the list of accept-
able noncharacter theories of logical relevance.37 This theory
"suppl[ies] a frequent ticket of admissibility" for evidence of un-
charged misconduct.38 Reversals for erroneously admitting uncharged
misconduct under this theory are "few and far between.
39
In recent years, the plan doctrine has proven to be one of the
most controversial theories for admitting uncharged misconduct.
40
Some critics have charged that by irresponsibly invoking the theory
without careful analysis,4 1 many courts have converted plan into a
33. See York, 933 F.2d at 1350.
34. FED. R. EvID. 404(b); CAL. EVlD. CODE § 1101(b) (West Supp. 1994).
35. E.g., People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 393-99, 867 P.2d 757, 764-68, 27 Cal. Rptr.
2d 646, 653-57 (1994).
36. Id. at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
37. FED. R. EvID. 404(b); CAJ. EVID. CODE § 1101(b).
38. People v. Covert, 249 Cal. App. 2d 81, 86, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (1967).
39. 2 LOUiSELL & MUELLER, supra note 27, § 140, at 261.
40. See MtNDEZ, supra note 20, § 3.14, at 56-64.
41. 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 404[16], at 404-97 (Supp. Mar. 1994).
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"euphemism" for bad character 42 and have allowed the theory to de-
generate into "a dumping ground" for inadmissible bad character evi-
dence. 43 Whatever else may be said about the theory, it is evident that
its scope is now a major battleground between prosecutors and de-
fense counsel.44
In the span of a single decade, the California Supreme Court has
twice issued major pronouncements about the scope of the plan the-
ory. Ten years ago, in People v. Tassell,45 the court advocated a re-
strictive view of the evidence necessary to invoke the theory.' Tassell
instantly became the leading defense precedent. 47 But a mere ten
years later, in People v. Ewoldt,4 the court did a complete about-face,
overruling this aspect of Tassell.49 Ewoldt is as forceful a prosecution
precedent as Tassell was a defense victory.
Our thesis is that the 1984 Tassell opinion was a well-reasoned
decision and that the 1994 Ewoldt decision represents a step backward
in the administration of the character evidence rules. Part II of this
Article reviews the general split of authority over the scope of the
plan theory. That split of authority was the historical backdrop for
Tassell. Part III describes how Tassell and its progeny triggered a na-
tional trend toward a more constrained application of the plan theory.
Part IV details the court's reasoning in Ewoldt. The remaining sec-
tions explain why Ewoldt was wrongly decided.50 Ewoldt is flawed as
a matter of evidentiary policy. Our hope is that by exposing the flaws
in Ewoldt, this Article will help preempt a dangerous countertrend
toward the undue expansion of the plan theory. In our opinion, Tas-
sell imposed much needed limitations on the plan theory, and it would
42. People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 85, 679 P.2d 1, 5, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 571 (1984),
overruled by People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380,401, 867 P.2d 757,769,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646,
658 (1994). Ewoldt overruled Tassell "to the extent [it] hold[s] that evidence of a defend-
ant's uncharged similar misconduct is admissible to establish a common design or plan only
where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot."
Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
43. 22 CHARLEs ALAN WRirr & KENNm-TH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACtiCE
AND PROCEDURE § 5244, at 499 (1978).
44. See MtNDEz, supra note 20, § 3.14, at 56-64.
45. 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567.
46. Id. at 84, 679 P.2d at 4, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
47. Edward J. Imwinkehied, The Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of the Defend-
ant's Uncharged Crimes: A Microcosm of the Flaws in the Uncharged Misconduct Doctrine,
50 Mo. L. Rnv. 1, 13 (1985).
48. 7 Cal. 4th 380, 867 P.2d 757, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (1994).
49. Id. at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
50. See infra parts V-VI.
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be a tragedy if Ewoldt subverted the fairness that Tassell sought to
achieve in the administration of the character evidence rules.
II. THE PRE-TAssELL SPLIT OVER THE SCOPE OF THE PLAN
THEORY
The California Evidence Code, like the common law and the Fed-
eral Rules of.Evidence, recognizes that under some circumstances, ev-
idence of the accused's misconduct can be offered under the plan
doctrine without offending the ban on character evidence.51 The rub
under all three systems of evidence is that the term "plan" is not de-
fined.5 2 Not surprisingly, different understandings have emerged. It
would be a mistake, however, to overstate the differences among the
courts. The published opinions can be synthesized into four catego-
ries, and the present controversy 3 relates principally to only one of
them.
In the first three categories, all the crimes-both charged and un-
charged-are the product of some prior,54 conscious55 resolve 56 in the
accused's mind.57 The accused formulates a single,58 overall5 9 grand
design that encompasses both the charged and uncharged offenses.
60
That design is overarching; 61 all the crimes are integral62 compo-
nents63 or portions" of the same plan. Each crime is a step65 or
51. FED. R. EviD. 404(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West Supp. 1994); 2 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 304 (James H. Chadboum
ed., 4th ed. 1979).
52. 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 1 404[16], at 404-97 (Supp. Mar. 1994).
53. See MNDEz, supra note 20, § 3.14, 56-64.
54. 2 LOuISELL & MUELLER, supra note 27, § 140, at 257.
55. 22 Wior & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 500.
56. 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 27, § 140, at 257.
57. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 515 (Supp. 1994) (citing Cook v.
State, 650 P.2d 863, 868 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982)).
58. People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 84, 679 P.2d 1, 4, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (1984),
overruled by People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401, 867 P.2d 757, 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646,
658 (1994).
59. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 507 (Supp. 1994).
60. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d at 84 h.4, 679 P.2d at 5 n.4, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 571 n.4.
61. 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 27, § 190, at 801.
62. Id. at 800.
63. 2 LOUIsELL & MUELLER, supra note 27, § 140, at 262 n.97 (citing United States v.
Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 502-04 (11th Cir. 1982)).
64. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.5, at 207 n.12
(3d ed. 1991) (citing People v. Barbour, 436 N.E.2d 667, 672 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
65. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 515-16 (Supp. 1994) (citing State




stage 66 in the execution of the plan. Each is a means to achieving the
same goal.
A. A True Plan of the Sequential Variety
One variation of the single, overall grand design is sometimes
called a sequential plan.67 Sequential plans are characterized by a nat-
ural sequence or order. One crime is predicated upon the commission
of another.6 8 For example, the accused first breaks into a bank presi-
dent's residence on January 1, steals the key to the side door to the
bank, and then uses the key to burglarize the bank on February 1.
The accused perpetrated the January crime as a means to facilitate the
commission of the February offense.69 In a prosecution for commit-
ting the second offense, the prosecutor can offer evidence of the first
offense as proof that the accused perpetrated the burglary. The prose-
cutor will urge the jurors to find that the accused committed the sec-
ond offense because it was an outgrowth of the accused's uncharged
misconduct;7 one crime was the precursor of the other.71 Examples
of sequential plans abound.7Z In all these cases, evidence of un-
charged offenses can be used to prove some element of the offense
charged without violating the prohibition on the use of character evi-
dence. If the January crime were the charged offense, the February
burglary would be admissible as proof of the accused's motive to com-
mit the earlier crime;73 evidence of motive to commit that crime
would single the accused out as the perpetrator. The February crime
could also be offered to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the
66. Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 312 (D.C. 1987).
67. See Imwinkelried, supra note 47, at 10.
68. RiCHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EV-
IDENCE 227 (2d ed. 1982).
69. See Jeffrey H. Contreras, Note, Evidence: Admissibility of Other Crimes to Estab-
lish a Common Scheme or Plan-Hall v. State, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 103, 112 (1984).
70. See 22 WRIGHr & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 500.
71. 1 McCon~icK, supra note 27, § 190, at 800 n.15 (citing United States v. Parnell,
581 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979)).
72. E.g., Lewis v. United States, 771 F.2d 454, 458 (10th Cir.) (accused broke into ga-
rage to steal cutting torch and then employed torch to burglarize post office), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1024 (1985); United States v. Carroll, 510 F.2d 507, 509 (2d Cir. 1975) (early
crimes committed in order to determine whether conspirators were capable of committing
later, more serious offense), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976); State v. Yoshino, 364 P.2d
638, 642 (Haw. 1961) (during robbery of first victim, accused obtained name and address of
next victim); State v. Long, 244 P.2d 1033, 1046 (Or. 1952) (after obtaining truck by killing
owner, accused used truck in robbery); 1 McCoRMIcK, supra note 27, § 190, at 800 nn.15-
16 (citing cases allowing use of other crimes evidence to prove existence of plan).
73. See 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 27, § 190, at 806.
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January crime by establishing possession of a fruit of that crime,
namely, the key.74 Conversely, if the February crime were the
charged offense, the January crime would be admissible as proof that
the accused was the perpetrator of the February offense. The prose-
cutor's theory would be that the accused committed the first offense in
order to facilitate the commission of the second.75 In neither case
would the prosecutor have to invite the jury to infer the accused's
guilt from a predisposition to commit the crime charged. In both
cases, the prosecutor would be relying on acknowledged noncharacter
theories of logical relevance.
B. A True Plan of the Chain Variety
Another variation of the plan doctrine has been dubbed a chain
plan.76 Assume that the accused decides to gain control of a business
by killing the accused's partners77 or to acquire title to realty by mur-
dering all the competing heirs with superior claims to the property.
78
A chain plan is distinguishable from a sequential plan in that there is
no necessary order to the crimes. The accused may attain the above
goals by killing the other partners or heirs in any. sequence. But the
accused is not simply a random killer who acts out of a propensity to
kill. Rather, the accused has a larger,79 more comprehensive8" goal in
mind, and each crime is but a means to achieving that goal.8 1 There
are many examples of chain plans. The accused attempts to bribe
enough members of a city council to obtain a majority of the votes,8 2
or to injure so many of a company's nonunion truck drivers that the
74. See id. at 808.
75. See id. at 800 n.15 (citing Lewis v. United States, 771 F.2d 454, 458 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1024 (1985)).
76. See Imwinkelried, supra note 47, at 10.
77. 22 WNirrr & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 517 n.15 (Supp. 1994) (citing
State v. Cruz, 672 P.2d 470 (Ariz. 1983)).
78. Id. at 501.
79. GRAHAM, supra note 64, § 404.5, at 208 n.12 (citing United States v. Krezdorn, 639
F.2d 1327, 1331 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984)); 1 MCCORMICK, supra
note 27, § 190, at 800-01; 22 WRiGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 500; id. § 5244,
at 511 n.8 (Supp. 1994) (citing United States v. Barron, 707 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1983)).
80. 22 WRiGrHT & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 512 n.8 (Supp. 1994) (citing
United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1331 (5th Cir. 1981)).
81. 2 WEINSTEIn & BERGER, supra note 14, [ 404[16], at 404-97 n.7 (Supp. Mar. 1994)
(citing United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 163, 177 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
718 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983)).
82. William Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic
Approach, 9 PEPP. L. REv. 297, 308 nA1 (1982).
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company must bargain with the accused's union. 3 In each instance,
the accused has a specific objective, and achieving that objective re-
quires the commission of multiple crimes.8 Once again, irrespective
of the crime the accused is charged with, the prosecutor is entitled to
offer the other crimes as uncharged misconduct. The prosecutor does
not need to draw any forbidden inference from the accused's bad
character to demonstrate the logical relevance of the uncharged
offenses.
C. A True Plan of the Bizarre Variety
A third variation of the plan doctrine allows prosecutors to argue
that what may appear at first blush to be inadmissible character evi-
dence is in truth offered for a relevant noncharacter purpose.85 The
sequential and chain plan theories presuppose the introduction of evi-
dence which jurors can recognize as comprising a plan.86 Suppose,
however, that the prosecutor is unable to produce such evidence.
Criminals, especially murderers, often have bizarre motivations for
their conduct'-motivations that would not readily occur to most ju-
rors. What may appear to be unconnected crimes to most people may,
however, be the product of a common plan hatched by a warped crim-
inal mind.8 The accused's written89 or oral statements9° may be evi-
dence that the accused harbored such a plan. The accused's diary
might describe the various crimes as "phases" or "stages."
Although the accused's goals may be unfathomable to the jurors,
here too the prosecutor could articulate the logical relevance of the
evidence without relying on forbidden character inferences. To be
sure, the evidence may be more vulnerable to exclusion under a
judge's discretionary powers to exclude relevant evidence. California
Evidence Code section 352 and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 em-
power a trial judge to exclude relevant evidence when its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the enumerated concerns, includ-
83. Peats v. State, 12 N.E.2d 270 (Ind. 1938).
84. Imwinkelried, supra note 47, at 10.
85. Id. at 11.
86. See id. at 10-11.
87. Id at 11.
88. W.A. Harrington, Annotation, Remoteness in Tune of Other Similar Offenses Com-
mitted by Accused as Affecting Admissibility of Evidence Thereof in Prosecution for Sex
Offense, 88 A.L.R. 3d 8, 36 (1978) (citing State v. Thorne, 260 P.2d 331 (Wash. 1953)).
89. People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978) (holding ledger
containing names of victims tends to show how defendant recruited victims).
90. Hicks v. State, 389 S.W.2d 950, 951-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
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ing notably, the danger of unduly prejudicing the objecting party.91
Because of their peculiar nature, evidence of bizarre plans might not
be as probative of a common plan or scheme as evidence of sequential
or chain plans. From a purely relevance perspective, however, evi-
dence of bizarre plans may be offered as proof of an admissible
noncharacter proposition.
D. Unlinked or Spurious Plans
There is a widespread consensus that in each of the three com-
mon plan variations described above, the uncharged misconduct evi-
dence may be admitted without affront to the character evidence
prohibition.92 The consensus ends abruptly, however, over the admis-
sibility of a fourth variation. Prosecutors relying on this variation at-
tempt to prove some element of the charged offense by showing that
the accused conmitted, within a fairly tight time frame, crimes similar
to the one charged.93 The similarities between the charged and un-
charged offenses are, however, insufficient to satisfy the test for the
existence of a truly distinctive modus operandi.94
Moreover, the prosecutor is unable to produce any direct evi-
dence that the accused committed the charged and uncharged offenses
as part of a single common plan. The only evidence available to the
prosecution is that all the crimes were committed in roughly the same
fashion.95 One inference that the jurors can draw is that each crime
was an end in itself; its commission was "the result of an impulse born
of the moment"96 when the opportunity randomly presented itself.
Since the crimes are not connected, this variation of the plan doctrine
is sometimes termed the "unlinked" plan.97
The courts are in sharp disagreement over the admissibility of ev-
idence of unlinked plans. Some courts treat evidence that the charged
and uncharged offenses were committed in roughly the same fashion
as adequate proof of the existence of a plan, thereby permitting the
91. FED. R. EVID. 403; CAL EvID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
92. See supra parts II.A-C.
93. See 22 WRGHTr & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 518 n.19 (Supp. 1994) (citing
People v. Wills-Watkins, 99 Cal. App. 3d 451, 160 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1979)).
94. Imwinkelried, supra note 47, at 13.
95. 22 WRIGirr & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 507 (Supp. 1994).
96. State v. Buxton, 22 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Mo, 1929).
97. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases,
78 MIN. L. REv. 529, 547 (1994).
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introduction of the uncharged misconduct. 98 These courts require the
prosecutor to demonstrate only that the charged and uncharged
crimes were similar and temporally proximate. 99 The courts do not
conduct a "detailed analysis"'1 to determine whether a common ob-
jective in fact inspired the accused to commit all the crimes.101
Other courts disagree. These courts believe that, without addi-
tional proof of the accused's intentions, evidence about recent, similar
crimes does not amount to proof of a plan."°2 For the most part, aca-
demic commentators concur with these courts.10 3 The commentators
condemn the unlinked plan theory as tolerating spurious plans' ° 4 and
criticize the courts that advocate the unlinked plan theory for trans-
forming plan into an incantation for circumventing the prohibition on
the use of character evidence. 05 Proof that the accused has recently
committed similar crimes is probably the most cogent method of prov-
ing the accused's propensity to perpetrate that type of crime.106 Thus,
these critics find it anomalous to treat the same showing as an ade-
quate predicate for the noncharacter theory that the accused commit-
ted the charged crime pursuant to a plan. It strikes them as
98. E.g., United States v. Wright, 943 F.2d 748,751 (7th Cir. 1991); State v. Hines, 354
N.W.2d 91, 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
99. United States v. Harvey, 959 F.2d 1371, 1374 (7th Cir. 1992); People v. Honey, 596
P.2d 751, 754 (Colo. 1979).
100. 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 1 404[16], at 404-97.
101. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 500.
102. E.g., United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273,1277-78 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 502 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141,
1153 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Harris, 677 P2d 202 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); 22 Wviunrr &
GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 507 (Supp. 1994).
103. But see Bryden & Park, supra note 97, at 547-48.
[T]his concept of "plan" is a textually plausible interpretation of the rule against
character reasoning. One pould construe the concept of "character" as referring
only to traits manifesting a general propensity, such as a propensity toward vio-
lence or dishonesty. Under this interpretation, a situationally specific propensity,
such as a propensity to lurk in the back seats of empty cars in shopping centers as
a prelude to sexual assaults on the owners, would be too specific to be called a
trait of character.
Id (footnote omitted).
104. Contreras, supra note 69, at 112, 115; Thomas Quigley, Note, Admissibility of Evi-
dehce Under Indiana's "Common Scheme or Plan" Exception, 53 IND. L.. 805, 811-12
(1978).
105. IaNDEz, supra note 20, § 3.14, at 59.
106. In a technical sense, testimony about an accused's reputation for a character trait,
or an acquaintance's opinion of the accused's trait, may be more direct evidence of charac-
ter than testimony about specific similar acts. However, as a practical matter, testimony
about recent, similar acts is likely to be the most convincing proof for lay jurors. 1 McCoR-
MIc, supra note 27, § 186, at 788.
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legerdemain to hold that the most persuasive showing of character
simultaneously qualifies as a noncharacter foundation. 0 7
Despite this criticism, at one time the courts approving the un-
linked plan theory were in the majorityY' 8 Throughout the country,
many courts routinely admitted evidence of other burglaries'0 9 or
drug offenses'" on this theory. Only a minority refused to stretch the
plan doctrine that far."' That was the state of the law in 1984 when
the California Supreme Court decided People v. Tassell." 2
III. TASSELL's REPUDIATION OF THE UNLINKED PLAN THEORY
A. The Tassell Decision
Tassell was charged with raping a waitress." 3 According to the
prosecution's evidence, Tassell asked the victim for a ride home at the
end of her shift." 4 He got the ride, but once they arrived at his stated
destination, he attempted to kiss her." 5 According to the victim,
when she rejected his advances, Tassell choked her, pulled her hair,
and raped her." 6 Tassell admitted accompanying the complainant
and having sex with her, but he denied raping her.1 7 He claimed that
she had consented to the sex acts."8
Over the accused's objection, the judge allowed the prosecutor to
call two witnesses, Mrs. G. and Cherie B., who also claimed to have
been raped by Tassell. 1 9 Mrs. G. testified that in 1976 Tassel fol-
lowed her after her shift as a barmaid. 20 When she resisted his at-
107. See Contreras, supra note 69, at 107 (stating that in sex-related cases Oklahoma
courts liberally admit evidence of other crimes "under the guise of the common scheme or
plan premise").
108. See 22 WmirHr & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 500.
109. People v. Moen, 526 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1974); Perry v. People, 181 P.2d 439 (Colo.
1947); 22 WR=Ir & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 500 n.9; Max D. Melville, Evi-
dence as to Similar Offenses, Acts or Transactions in Criminal Cases, 29 DicFA 235, 241
(1952).
110. 22 Wrirr & GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 5244, at 500 n.9.
111. See id at 500 & n.11.
112. 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984), overruled by People v. Ewoldt,
7 Cal. 4th 380, 401, 867 P.2d 757, 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 658 (1994).
113. Id. at 80, 679 P.2d at 2, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 80-81, 679 P.2d at 2, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
117. Id. at 81, 679 P.2d at 3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
118. Id.




tempt to kiss her, Tassell raped her.'2' Cherie B. testified that in 1977
Tassell gave her a ride and tried to kiss her."z When she rebuffed his
advances, he proceeded to rape her."2 The trial judge allowed the
testimony of Mrs. G. and Cherie B. on the ground that the two inci-
dents helped prove that the accused assaulted the complainant as part
of a plan to rape women. 24
The California Supreme Court held that it was error for the trial
judge to admit the evidence of the uncharged offenses."z Writing for
the majority, Justice Kaus took to task the early California cases ap-
plying the unlinked or spurious plan theory. He noted that at com-
mon law and by statute,2 6 the use of character as evidence that is
probative of conduct is "taboo."'" 7 Justice Kaus faulted many of the
prior California decisions for corrupting the plan theory of Evidence
Code section 1101(b) to "bestow[ ] ... a respectable label on a disrep-
utable basis" for admitting evidence of the accused's disposition to
commit the offense charged.'2 Because these decisions approved the
use of recent, similar uncharged offenses without explanation, they re-
duced the common plan doctrine to a transparent euphemism for bad
character.
29
To guide judges and parties on the proper use of common plan
evidence, Justice Kaus specified the foundation the prosecution must
lay. The prosecution must produce evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find that the accused had in mind "a 'single conception or
121. 1i.
122. Mi
123. Id. at 82-83, 679 P.2d at 3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
124. See iU at 82, 679 P.2d at 3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
125. Id. at 89, 679 P.2d at 8, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 574. There were two other opinions in
Tassell. Although Chief Justice Bird and Justices Broussard, Grodin, and Mosk concurred
with Justice Kaus, Justices Reynoso and Richardson each filed separate opinions, concur-
ring and dissenting. In his opinion, Justice Reynoso indicated that he agreed with Justice
Kaus's analysis of the plan theory;, Justice Reynoso wrote that "it appears" that the prior
California cases had employed the plan theory as "a euphemism for 'disposition.'" Id. at
92, 679 P.2d at 10, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 576 (Reynoso, J., concurring). However, he tried to
construct an argument that the uncharged misconduct was admissible to show intent. Id. at
92-96, 679 P.2d at 10-13, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 576-79 (Reynoso, J., dissenting). For his part,
Justice Richardson agreed with the result, affirming the accused's conviction. Id. at 96, 679
P.2d at 13,201 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (Richardson, J., concurring). However, he rejected Justice
Kaus's "analysis regarding the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes for the purpose of
demonstrating a 'common design or plan' on defendant's part." Id. (Richardson, J., dis-
senting). In so many words, he championed the spurious plan variation of the theory.
126. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1100-1101 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994).
127. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d at 86, 679 P.2d at 6, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
128. Id. at 84, 679 P.2d at 5, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
129. Id. at 85, 679 P.2d at 5, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
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plot' of which the charged and uncharged crimes are individual mani-
festations."'13 In other words, the accused must conceive of a particu-
lar objective,'131 and of all the crimes-both charged and uncharged-
as a means to attain that end. Justice Kaus described the prosecu-
tion's burden as necessitating evidence of a "grand design"'32 and in a
footnote provided examples of such plans.133 The foremost fall into
the chain plan category-a scheme to bribe a majority of the members
of a city board of supervisors and a plan to acquire property by mur-
dering the competing heirs.3 Justice Kaus not only attempted to re-
strict the scope of the plan theory, but he also reaffirmed the court's
earlier ruling in Thompson that to be admissible, proof of the exist-




Justice Kaus's opinion was so forcefully written and prescribed
such specific foundational requirements that it attracted considerable
attention. Tassell was the subject of articles in legal periodicals 36 and
was discussed widely on the continuing legal education circuit. It had
an immediate impact in California. 'Relying on Tassell, the intermedi-
ate appellate courts began to find error in the admission of uncharged
misconduct under the plan theory. In People v. Nottingham 37 the
court noted that the record was devoid of proof that the charged and
uncharged offenses "were integral components of a single conspiracy,
conception, or plot.' 38 In People v. Gordon1 39 the court found that
the prosecution's reliance on the plan theory was misplaced because it
was not relevant to any important, disputed issue such as intent or
identity.14° In People v. Ward141 and People v. Brunson,'42 the courts
130. Id. at 84, 679 P.2d at 5, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 570-71 (quoting People v. Covert, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 81, 86-87, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (1967)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 85, 679 P.2d at 5, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
133. Id. at 84 n.4, 679 P.2d at 5 n.4, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 571 nA.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 88, 679 P.2d at 7, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
136. Imwinkelried, supra note 47, at 13.
137. 172 Cal. App. 3d 484, 221 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985).
138. Id. at 498, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
139. 165 Cal. App. 3d 839, 212 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1985).
140. Id. at 860, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
141. 188 Cal. App. 3d 459, 233 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1986).
142. 177 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 223 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1986).
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found the same deficiency-lack of any important, disputed issue.143
Admittedly, some lower courts continued to reach results seemingly at
odds with Tassell.144 But the California Supreme Court continued to
adhere to its decision,145 and Tassell contributed to the view that, at
least in California, the unlinked plan theory was in disrepute and fall-
ing into disuse.
Tassell's influence was not confined to California:. The opinion
emboldened defense counsel throughout the United States to mount
attacks on the unlinked plan theory. After 1984, several federal courts
rejected the view that a mere showing of recent, similar crimes was
adequate proof of the existence of a plan. 46 State courts also em-
braced Tassell's narrow definition of a plan.147 Though Tassell accel-
erated the acceptance of a narrower understanding of a plan, as in
143. Ward, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 469, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 483; Brunson, 177 Cal. App. 3d at
1067, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 442. These courts indicated that uncharged misconduct may be
admissible in sex offense cases as evidence of the defendant's prior attraction toward a
particular person to prove that the defendant acted on this desire. Ward, 188 Cal. App. 3d
at 469, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 483; Brunson, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 1068, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
Both courts held, however, that the uncharged misconduct was not admissible under this
theory because the only evidence of the charged and uncharged acts was the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of the victim. Ward, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 469-70, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 483;
Brunson, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 1068,223 Cal. Rptr. at 443. In People v. Ewoldt the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that it would not strictly apply this rule. People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal.
4th 380,407-08, 867 P.2d 757,773,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 662 (1994) ("There will be circum-
stances ... in which the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness concerning
the defendant's uncharged misconduct will be admissible.").
144. E.g., People v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1986); People v.
Callan, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1101, 220 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1985).
145. People v. Ogunmola, 39 Cal. 3d 120, 701 P.2d 1173, 215 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1985),
overruled by People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401, 867 P.2d 757, 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646,
658 (1994) (overruling Ogunmola "to the extent [it] hold[s] that evidence of a defendant's
uncharged similar misconduct is admissible to establish a common design or plan only
where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot");
People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 685 P.2d 1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1984).
146. E.g., United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Slomething
more than a pattern and temporal proximity is required .... ."); Ali v. United States, 520
A.2d 306, 311-12 (D.C. 1987) ("[I]f there is no inference of a specific plan in the accused's
mind which interconnects the uncharged and charged acts, then the other crimes evidence
is offered for nothing other than the accused's propensity to commit a series of similar but
discrete bad acts .... The distinguishing characteristic of the common scheme or plan
exception to inadmissibility is the existence of a true plan in the defendant's mind which
includes the charged and uncharged crimes as stages in the plan's execution: the series of
crimes must be mutually dependent."); United States v. Rappaport, 22 MJ. 445, 447
(C.M.A. 1986) (requiring proof of overall scheme).
147. E.g., Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988) (holding accused's mere repetitive
commission of same type of crime is insufficient to prove plan); People v. VanderVliet, 508
N.W.2d 114, 119 n.6, 123 n.18 (Mich. 1993) (stating prosecutor must establish existence of
"true" plan).
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physics, such a dramatic departure from established precedent pro-
duced an opposite, equally forceful reaction. That occurred in 1994
when the California Supreme Court decided People v. Ewoldt
48
IV. THE REPUDIATION OF TAssELL: EW OLDT AND THE UNLINKED
PLAN THEORY
Ewoldt was prosecuted for engaging in lewd and lascivious acts
with his stepdaughter Jennifer.149 Unlike Tassell, who admitted inter-
course with the alleged victim but claimed consent, Ewoldt denied en-
gaging in the acts that the victim described. 150 To prove that the
accused had engaged in those acts, the trial judge allowed the victim's
sister to describe acts Ewoldt allegedly committed with her that were
similar to the acts described by Jennifer.' 51
Holding that the trial court had erred in admitting the sister's tes-
timony absent evidence that the accused committed the charged and
uncharged offenses as part of a common plan, the California Court of
Appeal reversed Ewoldt's conviction. 52 The California Supreme
Court in turn reversed. 5 3 The California Supreme Court reaffirmed
the principle that evidence of uncharged offenses may be used only to
prove some relevant proposition other than the accused's predisposi-
tion to commit the offense charged.' 54 However, the court took issue
with the portion of Tassell requiring the prosecution to prove that the
charged and uncharged offenses were part of a single, continuing con-
ception or plot. 55 The court disapproved of Tassell to that extent,
holding instead "that evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct
is relevant [and, therefore, admissible under the plan doctrine] where
the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently
similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a com-
mon design or plan."' 56
In describing the quantum of evidence the prosecution must offer
to sustain a claim of a common plan, the court found it useful "to
distinguish the nature and degree of similarity (between uncharged
misconduct and the charged offense) required ... to establish a com-
148, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 867 P.2d 757, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (1994).
149. Id. at 387, 867 P.2d at 759, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649.
150. Id. at 389, 867 P.2d at 760, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 390, 867 P.2d at 760, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
153. Id. at 408, 867 P.2d at 774, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663.
154. Id. at 393, 867 P.2d at 764, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.




mon design or plan, from the degree of similarity necessary to prove
intent or identity."'15 7 According to the court, the least degree of simi-
larity is required when the evidence of uncharged offenses is offered
to prove intent. The greatest degree is necessary when the evidence
of the uncharged offenses is offered to identify the accused as the per-
petrator of the charged offense.159 In order to be admissible to prove
identity, "the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense must
share common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to support
the inference that the same person committed both acts."'"
However, only an intermediate degree of similarity is required
when the uncharged offenses are offered in support of the claim that
the charged and uncharged offenses were committed as part of a com-
mon design or plan. 6' "[I]n establishing a common design or plan,
evidence of uncharged misconduct must demonstrate 'not merely a
similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features
that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a gen-
eral plan of which they are the individual manifestations.' "162 To "es-
tablish the existence of a common design or plan, the common
features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of
similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be dis-
tinctive or unusual.' 163
The reference to "spontaneous acts" is significant. If the charged
and uncharged acts are truly spontaneous, they cannot be connected
and, therefore, cannot be the product of a plan as defined by Tassell
or even by Ewoldt. "[P]urely opportune" conduct differs from
planned behavior.164 Under the teaching of both cases, a plan does
not encompass unrelated crimes committed against random "targets
157. Id. at 402, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
158. Id, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659; see also Jankins v. TDC Management
Corp., 21 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding evidence of uncharged misconduct inadmissi-
ble to show intent or common scheme because there was no similarity between charged
and uncharged acts).
159. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 403, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
160. Id.
161. Id at 402, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
162. Id. (quoting 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 304, at 249 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 4th ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted)).
163. Id. at 403, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
164. United States v. Ivery, 999 F.2d 1043, 1046 n.4 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir. 1992)). "Conduct is 'purely opportune' only if it is
spur of the moment conduct, intended to take advantage of a sudden opportunity." Id
(quoting United States v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir. 1992)).
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of opportunity."165 Unless offered under some other noncharacter
theory, unconnected acts give rise only to the inference that the ac-
cused perpetrated the offense charged because of a predisposition to
commit such offenses. Because the character evidence doctrine pro-
hibits jurors from drawing and using this inference, Tassell implicitly
rejected the unlinked plan theory as a ploy for circumventing the
prohibition. 66
By disapproving the use of spontaneous acts as adequate evi-
dence of a plan, Ewoldt too must be read as condemning the unlinked
plan theory. However, Ewoldt's condemnation of the unlinked plan
theory is suspect because Ewoldt eliminated Tassell's requirement
that the prosecution proffer evidence that the charged and uncharged
misdeeds were the product of a single plan. 67 The key question is
whether, by doing so, the Ewoldt majority fashioned a test so lax that
it effectively permits the misuse of uncharged misconduct as proof of
bad character.
Justice Mosk answered that question in the affirmative. 168 In his
dissent he underscored the lack of any required foundational evidence
from which the sort of "overarching plan" contemplated by Tassell
could be inferred. 6 9 Without that evidence the testimony that Ewoldt
molested the victim's sister could be received only to prove that he
was the kind of person who was predisposed to commit the molesta-
tion charged. In Justice Mosk's view the foundation prescribed by the
majority was logically sufficient only "to draw the inference from the
earlier crime that it is defendant's inclination or nature to commit
such crimes."'170 Whether Justice Mosk is right depends on the degree
to which Ewoldt differs from Tassell and inadvertently resurrects the
unlinked plan theory.
V. Ti PoINTs OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EWOLDT AND TSSELL
It would be simplistic to assert that the Tassell and Ewoldt opin-
ions are diametrically opposed. Quite to the contrary, the two opin-
ions agree on numerous points. First, both agree that evidence of an
165. People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 883, 909, 751 P.2d 395, 412, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 353,
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988).
166. People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 88, 679 P.2d 1, 7, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 573 (1984),
overruled by People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401, 867 P.2d 757, 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646,
658 (1994).
167. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
168. Id. at 411, 867 P.2d at 776, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665 .(Mosk, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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accused's uncharged crimes may not be offered on a character theory
of logical relevance.171 Ewoldt rejected the California Attorney Gen-
eral's argument that the character evidence prohibition was no longer
in effect in criminal cases in California. 172 Second, both opinions rec-
ognize that proof of the existence of a plan, including the charged and
uncharged offenses, is a legitimate noncharacter theory of admissibil-
ity.17 3 Third, both avow that proof of a plan requires a showing of
connected acts-rather than spontaneous, random acts. 74 Finally, the
two opinions are in accord that a mere showing of similar results is
insufficient to establish the requisite connection between the charged
and uncharged offenses. 75 Given these points of agreement, in many
cases the Tassell and Ewoldt tests yield identical results. Consider two
hypotheticals.
A. A Case in Which the Prosecution Has Direct Evidence That the
Accused Formulated an Antecedent Plan Including the
Charged and Uncharged Crimes
Assume that C is prosecuted for killing B. To prove that C killed
B, the prosecution calls W to testify that C told W that C killed B as
part of a plan to kill A and B. W, who was not present when C alleg-
edly killed B, is also prepared to testify to seeing C kill A. May the
evidence be received without violating the ban on the use of character
evidence?
Under both Tassell and Ewoldt, the answer is yes. The jury is not
being asked to find that C killed B on the basis that, because C killed
A, C is the kind of person who kills. That, as we have seen, is pre-
cisely the taboo inference which the character evidence doctrine pro-
hibits.176 Rather, the jury is being asked to find that C murdered B as
171. 1& at 393, 399, 867 P.2d at 763, 768, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652, 657; People v. Tassell,
36 Cal. 3d 77, 88, 679 P.2d 1, 7, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 573 (1984), overruled by People v.
Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401, 867 P.2d 757, 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 658 (1994).
172. The Attorney General argued that Proposition 8, an initiative measure passed in
1982, had overturned the character evidence prohibition set out in California Evidence
Code § 1101. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 390,867 P.2d at 761,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650. However,
the court did not reach the merits of that argument. Id. The court found that a post-1982
legislative amendment to § 1101 had the effect of reinstating that code section. Id.
173. Id. at 393, 867 P.2d at 763-64,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652-53; Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d at 83-
84, 679 P.2d at 3-5, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569-71.
174. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 403, 867 P.2d at 770,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659; Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d
at 84-85, 679 P.2d at 4-5, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 570-71.
175. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 402,867 P.2d at 770,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659; Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d
at 85-86, 679 P.2d at 5-6, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 571-72.
176. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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part of a plan to kill A and B. Indeed, the prosecution has direct
evidence that C formulated such a plan: W will testify that C told W
that C conceived of the plan. To protect C against the misuse of the
testimony as character evidence, C is entitled to have the jurors in-
structed to consider the evidence only for its admissible, noncharacter
purpose.177
Although the testimony is logically relevant on a noncharacter
theory, the judge could still exclude W's testimony. Under California
Evidence Code section 352 and Federal Rule of Evidence 403, a judge
may exclude relevant evidence whenever its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by its prejudicial effects.178 Since W's testimony
is also probative of the proposition that C killed B because of C's
predisposition to kill, a judge could conclude that, realistically, the risk
is too great that the jurors will be unable to abide by the limiting
instruction.
A review of the principles relating to relevance confirms the va-
lidity of this analysis of the initial hypothetical. An item of evidence is
relevant if it is probative of a material proposition.179 A material
proposition in this case is that C killed B. Evidence that C killed B as
part of a plan to kill A and B is probative of that proposition; the
evidence renders the proposition that C killed B more likely than it
would be without the evidence. C had an antecedent plan to kill both
A and B, and subsequently carried out part of the plan by murdering
A; hence, it is more likely that he executed the last part of the plan by
killing B.
But the evidence has dual relevance; the same evidence is also
probative of C's predisposition to kill. The proposition that C is
predisposed to kill is rendered more likely by evidence that C killed
A-whether or not pursuant to a plan-than that proposition would
be without the evidence. Evidence that C is predisposed to kill, in
turn, is probative of the material proposition that C killed B since that
proposition is rendered more likely by evidence of C's inclination to
kill than the proposition would be without the evidence.
Sometimes evidence can be susceptible to two uses, one that is
permissible while the other is not. Evidence law customarily resolves
this apparent conflict by providing that evidence which is inadmissible
for one purpose may nevertheless be received for an admissible pur-
177. FED. R. EviD. 105; CAt. EVID. CODE § 355 (West 1966).
178. FED. R. Evn,. 403; CAL. Evm. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
179. FED. R. Evm. 401; CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966).
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pose. 80 A judge who allowed W to testify would invoke this principle
and instruct the jurors to consider the evidence only for the admissible
noncharacter purpose.' 8 '
W's testimony does not pose unusually severe evidentiary
problems. If true, C's admission to W of killing B as part of a plan to
kill A and B provides persuasive evidence that C may have killed B as
a result of the same, antecedent plan. Though the evidence also lends
itself to a character inference, W's testimony provides a firm basis for
a noncharacter finding that C killed B pursuant to a plan. A properly
instructed jury could thus use the evidence for the proper purpose
contemplated by the rules of evidence.
B. A Case in Which the Only Common Denominator Between the
Charged and Uncharged Crimes Is Similarity in Result
Severe evidentiary problems, however, most assuredly arise when
the prosecution relies only on circumstantial evidence to prove the
plan. Suppose that the only evidence of the alleged plan consists of
W's testimony that W saw C kill A. Should a judge exclude the testi-
mony as constituting inadmissible character evidence? The best argu-
ment for admission is that the evidence is probative of the proposition
that C killed B as part of a plan to kill A and B. An item of evidence
is logically relevant so long as it ever so slightly affects the balance of
probabilities of the existence of any fact in issue. The fact in issue is
whether C killed B. The prosecution can contend that the proposition
that C killed B pursuant to the plan is rendered more likely by evi-
dence that C killed A than the proposition would be without the
evidence.
The counterpoint-the most powerful argument against admis-
sion-is that the evidence is at least equally probative of the opposite
proposition, namely that the killings of A and B were unconnected. If
they were unconnected, absent some other noncharacter justification,
evidence that C killed A would be probative only of the proposition
that C is the kind of person who kills; and the character evidence doc-
trine would prohibit using W's testimony as a basis for inferring that C
killed B.
The validity of this analysis of the second hypothetical is con-
firmed when W's testimony is viewed from the perspective of the ac-
cused, C. If C's objective is to show that the two killings are
180. FED. R. EviD. 105; CAL. EVD. CODE § 355.
181. FED. R. Evn,. 105; CAL. EVID. CODE § 355.
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unconnected or "unlinked," C could do so simply by offering evidence
that A was killed on one day and B on another. From a relevance
perspective, the proposition that the killings are unconnected is ren-
dered more likely by evidence that the killings occurred on different
days than that proposition would be without the evidence. The prob-
lem with the circumstantial use of past misdeeds to prove a common
plan is that in many cases the evidence is at least as probative of the
proposition that the accused committed the charged misdeed because
of his or her predisposition-or character-to commit such misdeeds.
How serious is the risk that the jurors will be unable to abide by a
limiting instruction? As pointed out, social scientists have found that
laypeople routinely use character-type reasoning in making everyday
decisions.182 Several aspects of their research are especially troubling
in a courtroom setting.
To begin with, people tend to remember the bad about others
rather than the good.183 Hence, jurors hearing about the accused's
uncharged misdeeds are likely to remember them in reaching their
verdict and might well ignore countervailing evidence about the ac-
cused's good deeds. Next, social scientists have discovered that past
behavior is a poor basis for predicting future behavior.184 The fact
that C killed A does not dictate the conclusion that C killed B.1
8 5
Whether or not the first killing tells us anything about the second one
depends on the identity of the circumstances attending the two inci-
dents. Even trivial differences between the two killings can reduce the
predictive value of the first killing to zero. 86 Lastly, laypeople em-
ploying past behavior to predict future behavior tend to overestimate
the influence of past conduct on future behavior. 87 In other words,
hearing that C killed A, jurors are likely to jump to an unwarranted
conclusion that C killed B.
In light of these risks, any testimony about C's killing of A would
be excluded under both Tassell and Ewoldt. Just as both courts would
admit the evidence in the prior hypothetical, both courts would ex-
182. See Miguel A. M6ndez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence
Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1003,
1048 (1984).
183. See id. at 1044-58 (noting psychologists have found that people give greater weight
to unfavorable information about a person than to favorable information of equal
intensity).






elude the evidence on these facts. Absent additional evidence of a
connection between the murders of A and B, the only foundational
evidence is a similarity in result between the two crimes, namely,
deaths. The Ewoldt court specifically stated that a mere showing of
similarity of result between the charged and uncharged crimes is insuf-
ficient proof of the existence of a plan linking the crimes
88
In summary, the two opinions agree in the easy cases. On the one
hand, when the prosecutor is lucky enough to have direct evidence of
the existence of a plan-a declaration by the accused that he or she
had formulated the plan-both courts would admit the uncharged
misconduct as evidence that the accused committed the charged and
uncharged offenses as part of the same plan. On the other hand, when
the only evidence of a connection between the charged and uncharged
offenses is a gross similarity in result, both courts would exclude the
evidence.
The two opinions disagree,, however, about the admissibility of
the uncharged offenses when the evidence of a plan falls somewhere
between these polar extremes. A case in point would be one in which
the prosecution's evidence embraces more that just a similarity in ba-
sic result between the charged and uncharged crimes. In the words of
the Ewoldt court, the prosecution's evidence would include also sev-
eral other "common features,"'18 9 such as some similarities in the way
the two killings were committed. At this juncture Ewoldt and Tassell
part company.
VI. THE POINT OF DIsAGREMENT BETWEEN EWOLDT AND
TASSELL-AND THE SUPERIORITY OF THE TASSELL
OPINION
Tassell's limitations on the use of character evidence reflect the
law's abiding fears about the dangerousness of this kind of evidence.
Tassell seeks to allay these fears by requiring prosecutors to offer
foundational evidence that the charged and uncharged misdeeds were
the product of a single plan. 9° Only then does the probative value of
the evidence on contested issues justify the risk of misuse by the ju-
rors. The foundational requirements are met when the prosecution
188. People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 402, 867 P.2d 757, 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 659
(1994).
189. Id at 403, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
190. People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 84, 679 P.2d 1, 4, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (1984),
overruled by People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401, 867 P.2d 757, 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646,
658 (1994).
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offers direct evidence of a single plan, for example, an admission by
the accused that he committed the charged and uncharged crimes as
part of one plan. Under Tassell, the requirements can also be met
circumstantially but only if the evidence allows the judge to conclude
that the charged and uncharged offenses were committed as part of a
"grand design," that is, as part of a single overarching objective as is
found in sequential and chain plans. But in reassessing the sufficiency
of the evidence needed to establish a plan circumstantially, Ewoldt
eliminated Tassell's "grand design" requirement. By rejecting this re-
quirement, Ewoldt creates serious risks that the jurors may disregard
the limiting instruction telling them to ignore the uncharged miscon-
duct as proof of the accused's bad character.
A. The Ewoldt Test for Evaluating the Sufficiency of the Proof of
the Existence of a Plan
As Part V explained, Ewoldt does not undo Tassell entirely.
Ewoldt leaves untouched the requirement that prosecutors refrain
from offering plan evidence unless it is directed at important, con-
tested issues.191 Also, Ewoldt does not quarrel with the assumption
that evidence of unconnected misdeeds serves only to prove the ac-
cused's predisposition to commit such misdeeds. 192
Ewoldt does, however, purport to relax the requirement that the
prosecution offer evidence that the charged and uncharged misdeeds
were the product of a single plan.193 Ewoldt holds that while the pros-
ecution must demonstrate more than just a similarity in results, it need
show only "'such a concurrence of common features [between the
charged and uncharged misdeeds] that the various acts are naturally
to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the
individual manifestations.' "194
To establish the existence of a common design or plan,
the common features must indicate the existence of a plan
rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan
thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.... [Evi-
dence] need only exist to support the inference that the de-
191. See Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 400, 867 P.2d at 768, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657.
192. See id. at 396-97, 867 P.2d at 766, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655 (citing People v. Sam, 71
Cal. 2d 194, 454 P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969)).
193. Id. at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
194. Id. at 402, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659 (quoting 2 JOHN HENRY Wi.
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 304, at 249 (James H. Chadboum ed., 4th
ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted)).
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fendant employed that plan in committing the charged
offense.1
95
Whatever this language may mean, Ewoldt, like Tassell, clearly rejects
the unlinked plan theory by requiring the prosecution to offer more
than just evidence that C killed A and that B was found dead.
How much more must the prosecutor offer under Ewoldt? To
answer that question requires a careful review of the majority's com-
ments about the noncharacter modus operandi theory for admitting
uncharged misconduct. Those comments and the majority's effort to
distinguish that theory from its version of the plan theory reveal the
drastic extent to which Ewoldt lowers the threshold for admitting evi-
dence of an accused's uncharged misconduct.
It is hornbook law that under the modus operandi theory prose-
cutors may offer evidence of the accused's uncharged misdeeds to
prove that the accused perpetrated the charged misdeed if the circum-
stances attending the commission of the uncharged and charged mis-
deeds are so distinctive as to establish that only one person-the
accused-perpetrated the charged misdeed.195 The prosecution meets
this burden by showing that the charged and uncharged crimes all
were committed with a distinctive methodology or modus operandi.
This evidence is also susceptible to a character interpretation-the ac-
cused committed the charged misdeed because, given the accused's
past misdeeds, he or she is the kind of person who would commit the
charged misdeed. But the risk that the evidence may be misused for a
character purpose is believed to be outweighed by its substantial value
as proof of the noncharacter proposition.' 97 To assure that the evi-
dence possesses that high degree of probative value, courts prohibit
prosecutors from using this route to admit evidence of the accused's
uncharged misdeeds unless the similarities between the charged and
uncharged misdeeds are so great as to warrant a finding that only the
accused could have committed the charged misdeed.198
The difficulty is that in the typical case, that finding cannot be
made; the degree of similarity between the charged and uncharged
crimes ordinarily falls short of demonstrating a truly distinctive modus
operandi. Prosecutors, therefore, must search for alternative theories
of admissibility which do not impose such rigorous requirements.
195. Id. at 403, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
196. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
198. GRApAm, supra note 64, § 404.5, at 208 n.14; 1 McCoRMIcK, supra note 27, § 190,
at 801 & n.19.
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Tassell sharply restricted the use of the plan theory as an alternative
by requiring prosecutors to offer evidence that the charged and un-
charged misdeeds were the product of a single plan.199 But, by
reversing this aspect of Tassell, Ewoldt threatens to undo the essential
protection that the character evidence prohibition is designed to af-
ford an accused.2'
The magnitude of the threat can be gauged by revisiting Ewoldt's
description of the quantum of evidence the prosecution must produce
to invoke the plan theory. In specifying the foundational require-
ments, Ewoldt distinguished "the nature and degree of similarity (be-
tween uncharged misconduct and the charged offense) required.., to
establish a common design or plan, from the degree of similarity nec-
essary to prove intent or identity."' According to the court, the least
degree of similarity is required when the evidence of uncharged of-
fenses is offered to prove intent. 2 When the prosecution relies on
the doctrine of chances to prove intent, a relatively low degree of simi-
larity is acceptable. The highest degree is necessary when the evi-
dence of the uncharged misdeeds is offered to identify the accused as
the perpetrator of the misdeed charged. 0 3 But only an intermediate
degree of similarity is mandatory when the uncharged misdeeds are
offered on the theory that the accused committed the charged mis-
deed as part of a plan to commit both the charged and uncharged
misdeeds. Thus, it is apparent from the court's own words that
when the prosecutors lack enough evidence to satisfy the identity test,
they can use the same evidence to meet Ewoldt's plan test. Tassell's
single plan test can be viewed as the functional equivalent of the simi-
larity test of the modus operandi doctrine. Both are designed to with-
hold evidence of uncharged offenses from the jurors unless the
commission of the charged and uncharged offenses is highly similar.
The Ewoldt majority, however, refused to allow the plan test to con-
tinue to play the same protective role.
199. People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 84, 679 P.2d 1, 4-5, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570-71
(1984), overruled by People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401,867 P.2d 757,769, 27 Cal. Rptr.
2d 646, 658 (1994).
200. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
201. Id. at 402, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
202. Id., 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
203. Id. at 403, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
204. Id at 402-03, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
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B. The Intolerable Risks Posed by the Ewoldt Test
In short, the Ewoldt majority takes the position that the existence
of a plan can be inferred from "common features" even when: (1) the
shared features fall short of proving a distinctive modus operandi;0 5
(2) there is no direct evidence of the existence of a plan in the form of
an admission by the accused;20 6 and (3) the circumstances do not sus-
tain an inference of the type of "grand design" 0 7 which Justice Kaus
alluded to in Tassell.208 Inferring a plan here-and consequently ad-
mitting the uncharged misconduct under the rubric of "plan"-creates
an unacceptable risk that the jury will treat the evidence as proof of
the accused's bad character.
Under Ewoldt the inference that the accused committed the
charged and uncharged offenses as part of one plan is so weak as to be
unacceptably speculative. Even when the accused's conduct is ran-
dom, an imaginative prosecutor will almost always be able to articu-
late a number of prosaic similarities in the methodology of the
charged and uncharged crimes: all were committed in daytime, all
were perpetrated at private residences, all the victims were middle-
aged, and all the crimes involved weapons. A person's character is
not an infallible predictor of the person's conduct, but the psychologi-
cal research indicates a measure of consistency in any given person's
behavior.20 9 Ewoldt mandates that the prosecutor show that charged
and uncharged crimes share "common features. '210 However, even
spontaneous, opportunistically perpetrated crimes will often display
many common features. Whenever the same person commits several
crimes of the same type, all the crimes will display some common
methodologies even if all the acts are spontaneous.
In contrast, a showing of common features is highly probative of
the accused's disposition to engage in the type of criminal conduct
with which he is charged. Again, perhaps the most persuasive evi-
dence of the accused's propensity to engage in a particular type of
misconduct consists of the accused's recent commission of similar mis-
205. Id. at 403, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
206. Id. at 393, 867 P.2d at 764, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.
207. People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 84, 679 P.2d 1, 5, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 571 (1984),
overruled by People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401, 867 P.2d 757,769,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646,
658 (1994).
208. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 402-03, 867 P.2d at 769-70, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658-59.
209. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct A Reassess-
ment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BuLL. 504, 514-20 (1991); see also Bryden & Park, supra
note 97, at 561-62 (surveying most recent psychological research).
210. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 402-03, 867 P.2d at 769-70, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658-59.
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deeds.211 While a mere showing of common features lends scant sup-
port to the inference that the accused acted pursuant to an antecedent
plan, that showing virtually impels the jury to conclude that, by char-
acter, the accused is predisposed to perpetrate the kind of offense
charged.
In assessing the risk that uncharged misconduct evidence will be
misused, the court must realistically consider the comparative value of
the evidence as proof of the proper and the forbidden inferences.212
The substantial value of the evidence as proof of character will simply
overwhelm its minimal value as proof of a plan. As a result, Ewoldt
places jurors in an impossible situation. They will be faced with a
seemingly strong character theory and a comparatively weak plan the-
ory. The value of the evidence as proof of character will be obvious
and persuasive; its value as proof of a plan will be tenuous and diffi-
cult "to discern. '21 3 Yet, the jurors must abide by the limiting instruc-
tion telling them to ignore the evidence as proof of the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged. In light of the differ-
ences in probative value, it is fanciful to think that jurors will disre-
gard the evidence as proof of character and consider it only as proof
of plan.
Even Tassell's requirement of proof of a grand design or a high
degree of similarity in the commission of the charged and uncharged
misdeeds does not eliminate entirely the risk that jurors will misuse
the evidence as proof of character. Obviously, the greater the similar-
ity in the manner in which the charged and uncharged misdeeds are
perpetrated, the greater the likelihood that only the accused commit-
ted the charged misdeed-modus operandi theory-or that the ac-
cused committed the misdeed charged as part of single scheme to
commit the charged and uncharged misdeeds-Tassell's plan theory.
But so is the likelihood that the accused committed the charged mis-
deed because the accused is the kind of person who would commit
such a misdeed. The uncharged misdeeds, after all, would be convinc-
ing evidence that the accused is predisposed to commit such offenses.
Any noncharacter theory of admissibility relying on the similarity
between the charged and uncharged misdeeds carries a risk that jurors
211. 1 McCoRMiCK, supra note 27, § 186, at 788.
212. P.B. Carter, The Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Facts, 69 LAW Q. REv. 80, 92
(1953); John T. Johnson, The Admissibility of Evidence of Extraneous Offenses in Texas
Criminal Cases, 14 S. TEx. L.. 69, 74 (1973).
213. GRAHAM, supra note 64, § 404.5, at 208 n.12 (quoting United States v. Lynn, 856
F.2d 430, 435 (1st Cir. 1988)).
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will misuse the evidence as proof of the accused's character to commit
the offense charged. But, as noted, the law of evidence resolves this
dilemma not by banning the use of other crimes evidence, but by bal-
ancing its value as proof of a noncharacter proposition against the risk
that it might be misused as proof of character.
Tassell reduces that risk to tolerable proportions. It permits the
introduction of uncharged misconduct under the plan theory only
when the foundational showing is highly probative of the proposition
that the accused formulated an earlier resolve encompassing the
charged and uncharged offenses.2"' Tassell helps ensure that jurors
will not be placed in an impossible situation. Its foundational require-
ments virtually guarantee that the formally noncharacter theory
presented to the jury will be well-substantiated and attractive. When
the jury is likely to find the evidence so probative on a legitimate the-
ory and the judge gives them a powerfully worded limiting instruction,
there is much less risk that they will resort to forbidden character
reasoning.
Ewoldt's mischief is not limited to the difficulties it creates for the
accused. It also puts jurors in an untenable situation. Ewoldt holds
that "evidence of a common design or plan is admitted not to prove
the defendant's intent or identity, but to prove that the defendant en-
gaged in the conduct alleged to constitute the charged offense.""21 It
may be that the court was attempting to prevent prosecutors who can-
not meet the rigorous modus operandi test from falling back on the
plan doctrine to prove that the accused committed the offense
charged. But that goal, commendable as it may be, creates serious
problems for the jurors. Applied to Ewoldt, evidence that Ewoldt
molested the victim's sister would be admissible to prove only that he
engaged in acts of molestation with Jennifer as part of a plan to molest
both sisters but not that he was the one who engaged in such acts with
Jennifer. How jurors are expected to abide by such a conflicting in-
struction is left unexplained by the court.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is possible that the lower courts will limit the Ewoldt decision
and carefully circumscribe the admission of uncharged misconduct ev-
idence. There is language in Ewoldt which an astute defense counsel
214. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d at 88, 679 P.2d at 7, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
215. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 399, 867 P.2d at 768, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657.
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might seize upon for that purpose. For example, near the end of its
opinion, the court cautioned:
[E]vidence of a common design or plan is admissible only to
establish that the defendant engaged in the conduct alleged
to constitute the charged offense, not to prove other matters,
such as the defendant's... identity as to the charged offense.
[I]n most prosecutions for crimes such as burglary and rob-
bery, it is beyond dispute that the charged offense was com-
mitted by someone; the primary issue to be determined is
whether the defendant was the perpetrator of that crime....
[I]n such circumstances, evidence that the defendant com-
mitted uncharged offenses that were sufficiently similar to
the charged offense to demonstrate a common design or plan
(but not sufficiently distinctive to establish identity) ordina-
rily would be inadmissible.216
The court also qualified its opinion by indicating that lower courts
should not construe Ewoldt as a blanket authorization to admit un-
charged misconduct evidence for the purpose of showing the accused's
intent.217 The court emphasized that to pass muster under Evidence
Code section 352, the evidence must relate to a disputed issue.218 Af-
ter recounting the lewd conduct which Jennifer had testified to, the
court stressed that "[i]f defendant engaged in this conduct, his intent
in doing so could not reasonably be disputed.
21 9
Although the defense bar can take some consolation from those
qualifications in the Ewoldt opinion, it would be a mistake to allow
the court's plan analysis to escape uncriticized. That analysis greatly
exacerbates the risk that jurors will treat uncharged misconduct evi-
dence as proof of the accused's bad character. Without repealing the
plan doctrine, there is only one way to eliminate altogether the risk
that jurors will misuse evidence proffered in support of a plan theory:
Judges could require the prosecution to offer direct evidence of the
existence of a plan in the accused's mind. However, the accused
rarely divulges his plans before trial; therefore such helpful admissions
will ordinarily be unavailable to the prosecution.
The risks associated with the doctrine can be ameliorated, though
not eliminated, by returning to the Tassell test. When the proof of the
plan consists only of circumstantial evidence, prosecutors should be
216. Id. at 406, 867 P.2d at 772, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 405-06, 867 P.2d at 772, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661.
219. Id. at 406, 867 P.2d at 772, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661.
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precluded from offering the uncharged misdeeds unless the evidence
warrants a finding by the trial judge that the charged and uncharged
misdeeds were indeed the product of a single plan. The finding of a
grand design can logically be drawn in the three true plan scenarios
described in Part II of this Article. Such a finding, however, should
not be based on the type of flimsy showing of common features sanc-
tioned by Ewoldt.
The need to assure that the accused are convicted only for what
they do and not for who they are, as well as the undesirability of plac-
ing jurors in untenable positions, argue for a return to the Tassell test.
In Newtonian terms, Tassell generated a momentum for reform of the
plan theory; and it would be a tragedy if Ewoldt, the "opposed...
reaction"220 to Tassell, were permitted to arrest that momentum.
220. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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